U.S. Sanctions Against Russia

(White House release)


Office of the Press Secretary


March 17, 2014


FACT SHEET:  Ukraine-Related Sanctions


President Obama today issued a new Executive Order (E.O.) under the national emergency with respect to Ukraine that finds that the actions and policies of the Russian government with respect to Ukraine -– including through the deployment of Russian military forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine –- undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets.


This new authority expands upon E.O. 13660, which the President signed less than two weeks ago, by authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on named officials of the Russian government, any individual or entity that operates in the Russian arms industry, and any designated individual or entity that acts on behalf of, or that provides material or other support to, any senior Russian government official.  We have fashioned these sanctions to impose costs on named individuals who wield influence in the Russian government and those responsible for the deteriorating situation in Ukraine.  We stand ready to use these authorities in a direct and targeted fashion as events warrant.


In response to the Russian government’s actions contributing to the crisis in Ukraine, this new E.O. lists seven Russian government officials who are being designated for sanctions.  These individuals are Vladislav Surkov, Sergey Glazyev, Leonid Slutsky, Andrei Klishas, Valentina Matviyenko, Dmitry Rogozin, and Yelena Mizulina.


The United States also will seek to hold accountable individuals who use their resources or influence to support or act on behalf of senior Russian government officials.  We recognize that the Russian leadership derives significant support from, and takes action through, individuals who do not themselves serve in any official capacity.  Our current focus is to identify these individuals and target their personal assets, but not companies that they may manage on behalf of the Russian state. 


In addition to the new E.O., the Treasury Department today has imposed sanctions on four other individuals under E.O. 13660, issued on March 6, for their actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine and in undermining the Government of Ukraine.  They are Crimea-based separatist leaders Sergey Aksyonov and Vladimir Konstantinov; former Ukrainian presidential chief of staff Viktor Medvedchuk; and former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych.


Today’s actions send a strong message to the Russian government thatthere are consequences for their actions that violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including their actions supporting the illegal referendum for Crimean separation.  The United States, together with international partners, will continue to stand by the Ukrainian government to ensure that costs are imposed on Crimean separatists and their Russian backers.  Today’s actions also serve as notice to Russia that unless it abides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the United States is prepared to take additional steps to impose further political and economic costs.


·         Vladislav Surkov:  Surkov is being sanctioned for his status as a Presidential Aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin.


·         Sergey Glazyev:  Glazyev is being sanctioned for his status as a Presidential Adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin.


·         Leonid Slutsky:  Slutsky is being sanctioned for his status as a State Duma deputy, where he is Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots. 


·         Andrei Klishas:  Klishas is being sanctioned for his status as a Member of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and as Chairman of the Federation Council Committee of Constitutional Law, Judicial, and Legal Affairs, and the Development of Civil Society.  


·         Valentina Matviyenko:  Matviyenko is being sanctioned for her status as Head of the Federation Council


·         Dmitry Rogozin:  Rogozin is being sanctioned for his status as the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.


·         Yelena Mizulina:  Mizulina is being sanctioned for her status as a State Duma Deputy.


·         Sergey Aksyonov:  Aksyonov is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes.  Aksyonov claims to be the Prime Minister of Crimea and has rejected the authority of the legitimate government in Kyiv.


·         Vladimir Konstantinov:  Konstantinov is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes.  Konstantinov is the speaker of the Crimean parliament, which on March 11, 2014, declared independence from Ukraine.


·         Viktor Medvedchuk:  Medvedchuk, leader of Ukrainian Choice, is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes.  He is also being designated because he has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support to Yanukovych and because he is a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine and actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.


·         Viktor Yanukovych:  Former Ukrainian President Yanukovych is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes.  After abandoning Kyiv and ultimately fleeing to Russia, Viktor Yanukovych called upon Russian President Vladimir Putin to send Russian troops into Ukraine.




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Senate Update

Kyle Kondik, UVA Ctr. for Politics

To demonstrate just how Republican this year’s Senate playing field is, consider this: Of the 36 Senate elections this year (33 regularly scheduled and three specials), the Crystal Ball sees 16 as at least potentially competitive at the moment. Of those races, 14 are currently held by Democrats, and just two are held by Republicans.

In other words, nearly all the competitive seats this cycle are in places where Democrats are playing defense. That fact alone indicates the GOP is poised for a strong cycle, although we’re not ready to say they will in fact win the six seats they need to take outright control of the Senate, even though they have a path to six -- or perhaps even several seats more than that. Democrats, meanwhile, would do quite well to hold the GOP to a net gain of three or four seats. Such are the perils of holding the White House in a midterm election on the best GOP Senate map of the three classes contested once every six years.









It’s possible that the Republicans will pick up the Senate even if 2014 is not a “wave” election: In fact, the likeliest election outcome at this point seems to be Republicans gaining something close to their needed number of Senate seats (five or six or so), but adding only a similar number of seats to their House majority and actually losing a few net governorships. That would make 2014 like 1986, a midterm year where Democrats captured the Senate in President Reagan’s “sixth-year itch” election, but picked up fewer seats in the House than they did in the Senate (five in the lower chamber versus eight in the upper) and actually lost eight net governorships. (We detailed the 1986 comparisons in depth earlier this cycle.)

In this Senate update, we wanted to quickly sum up the state of play in all the competitive races, but also give a sense of which seats are likeliest to change party hands. Our current ratings suggest that Republicans are at least slightly favored in four Democratic-held seats (Arkansas, Montana, South Dakota and West Virginia); have about even odds in another three (Alaska, Louisiana and North Carolina); and -- stretching here -- under near-perfect conditions could potentially compete in or even flip up to an additional seven seats beyond that (Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon and Virginia). Meanwhile, Democrats have outside shots in Georgia, Kentucky and perhaps -- if absolutely everything broke right for them -- Mississippi.

The following is our best guess as to how these dominoes would fall in November, ordered from likeliest to unlikeliest to flip parties. Let’s start with the long list of Democrats, followed by the Republicans, and then an overall ranking of all 16 competitive states.

Map 1: Crystal Ball Senate ratings

Democratic dominoes, listed in order of how likely they are to flip to the GOP

1. South Dakota: Any path to victory for Rick Weiland (D), the Tom Daschle protégé who is running here to replace retiring Sen. Tim Johnson (D), probably involves former Republican Sen. Larry Pressler, an independent in this race, cutting into ex-Gov. Mike Rounds’ (R) GOP support. However, it seems just as likely that Pressler will end up drawing votes from Weiland. In any event, this pretty clearly has been and remains the easiest Republican pickup in the country.

2. West Virginia: Some Republicans fret about a massive Democratic registered-voter edge in the Mountain State as well as the notable fact that the GOP hasn’t won a Senate race here since the 1950s, even as the state has swung heavily Republican over the last four presidential elections. Republicans also worry that West Virginia, a small state with generally cheap media markets (with the exception of the eastern panhandle, which is covered by the pricey Washington, D.C. market), looks like some of the other low-population, cheap media states where they have frittered away winnable Senate races in recent years (like Montana and North Dakota). All that said, Rep. Shelley Moore Capito (R, WV-2) looks like the right person to break the GOP dry spell here, even as Secretary of State Natalie Tennant (D) mounts a credible defense of the retiring Sen. Jay Rockefeller’s (D) seat. We’re keeping this race in the Leans Republican column for now, but it’s much closer to moving to the Likely Republican column than to Toss-up.

3. Montana: With now-Ambassador Max Baucus headed to China, Gov. Steve Bullock (D) appointed John Walsh (D), his former lieutenant governor, to a Senate seat that Republicans have never held since the passage of the 17th Amendment. Our sources in Montana believe Walsh still has a lot to prove, and the new incumbent continues to have some primary trouble: John Bohlinger (D), ex-Gov. Brian Schweitzer’s (D) former lieutenant governor, is continuing his challenge to Walsh. Put it all together and Rep. Steve Daines (R, MT-AL), who should be fine in his primary, remains a favorite even though he is now running against an incumbent.

4. Arkansas: Sen. Mark Pryor (D) didn’t do himself any favors the other day by saying that his opponent, Rep. Tom Cotton (R, AR-4), has a “sense of entitlement” because of his military service. A mistake like this is often overrated, although it’s not helpful for Pryor, who is already an underdog in Red-trending Arkansas. It’s fair to wonder if Pryor, who basically got a free pass in 2008, is really in prime fighting shape, although Cotton’s fairly outspoken economic conservatism in a state that is more Mike Huckabee than Paul Ryan provides an opening to the incumbent.

5. North Carolina: The fifth slot on these rankings could just as easily be one of our two other Toss-ups (Alaska and Louisiana), but we’re going with Sen. Kay Hagan (D) as the most vulnerable of the three. Hagan’s approval ratings are poor according to several recent polls, and while she is a very strong fundraiser, Democrats have to be worried about her performance as a candidate. State House Speaker Thom Tillis (R) needs to improve his fundraising, though, and he hasn’t yet put away his primary competitors: Tea Party Sen. Mike Lee (R- UT) recently joined Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) in endorsing physician Greg Brannon in the GOP primary, even though a jury recently found that Brannon had misled investors to a now-defunct technology company. Brannon or someone else other than Tillis could be a real problem for the GOP in the general election, though Tillis isn’t perfect either.

6. Alaska: Speaking of primaries, it’s been fascinating to watch the GOP contest in Alaska, where Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell (R) started as the favorite but has been such a mess that the nomination is now former state Department of Natural Resources Commissioner Dan Sullivan’s (R) to lose. In fact, a couple Republican operatives separately told us that if Treadwell continues on in the primary, the distraction could cost Sullivan the seat. Also planning to run in the August primary is Joe Miller, the Republican nominee who lost to Sen. Lisa Murkowski’s (R) write-in campaign in 2010. GOP leaders aren’t worried about Miller winning the nomination, but a three-way race could further bog down Sullivan. Meanwhile, Sen. Mark Begich (D) is, we believe, a formidable incumbent whose biggest problem remains the Last Frontier’s significant Republican lean.

7. Louisiana: The likeliest outcome in this race is probably overtime: A couple minor Republican candidates could prevent Rep. Bill Cassidy (R, LA-6) from finishing ahead of Sen. Mary Landrieu (D) in the November election, but if he can hold her under 50% -- and Landrieu is currently only polling in the low-to-mid 40s -- there will be a December runoff that could potentially decide the Senate. It’s our feeling, and the belief of some of our Republican contacts, that this is the heaviest lift for the GOP in the seven states won by Mitt Romney in 2012 that are represented by Democrats on this year’s Senate map (those states are the ones listed one through seven on this list).

8. Michigan: Some characterize this race as a Toss-up, but we’re not there yet. Yes, former Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land (R) has performed admirably so far, and national Republicans in particular seem to be pleasantly surprised after they unsuccessfully tried to get other candidates to enter. But Democrats (and even a Republican or two) argue that Land has run a sheltered race and that she will be exposed as a poor candidate, to the benefit of Rep. Gary Peters (D, MI-14). Michigan’s Democratic tilt in federal races is a factor, too -- though in the right year (such as 1994) it can be overcome.

9. Iowa: We get the sense that national Republicans favor state Sen. Joni Ernst (R), who was recently endorsed by Mitt Romney, to be their nominee here. However, Ernst hasn’t raised a ton of money and might have trouble winning the nomination. Mark Jacobs (R), a wealthy businessman who might also turn out to be a decent general election candidate, probably stands out with Ernst as the other top contender. If no one breaks 35% in a primary, anything could happen in an ensuing convention, including the nomination of a candidate ill-equipped to seriously challenge Rep. Bruce Braley (D, IA-1). With the right GOP nominee, this race could be a better Republican target than Michigan; with the wrong one, national Republicans might just write it off. One candidate we hear could be well positioned at a GOP convention is Sam Clovis, a radio host and college professor.

10. Colorado: After the entrance of Rep. Cory Gardner (R, CO-4), we moved this race from Likely Democratic to Leans Democratic. But despite Gardner stepping up against Sen. Mark Udall (D), the incumbent is a strong candidate with a golden last name. This race is more competitive than it was, but it -- like Iowa and Michigan -- is not a Toss-up as of yet.

11. New Hampshire: Simply put: If the Granite State Hamlet (former Republican Sen. Scott Brown of Massachusetts) gets in this race, it moves up this list. If he doesn’t, it moves down. Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D) would remain the starting favorite in any event, but a Brown candidacy would be a late development even more significant than Gardner’s entry in Colorado.

12. Minnesota: Given his narrow win in 2008, Sen. Al Franken (D) should probably be more vulnerable than he is, although Republicans hope that businessman Mike McFadden (R) could make a run at him. It’s not obvious, though, that McFadden will get through the GOP primary; state Sen. Julianne Ortman (R) beat him in a recent straw poll.

13. Virginia: Former Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie’s (R) respectable but long-shot challenge to Sen. Mark Warner (D) could benefit if some of the other races listed above fizzle for Republicans: The party has an embarrassment of riches in terms of targets, but national dollars might more readily flow here if Republican challenges in states like Iowa, New Hampshire and Minnesota don’t materialize. Then again, the proliferation of outside money groups on the GOP side might end up providing more than enough money to fund a baker’s dozen races -- and Gillespie should be able to raise a decent amount on his own. Warner remains very formidable, and if he somehow loses, it won’t be because he didn’t have the cash to compete.

14. Oregon: A credible GOP challenge to Sen. Jeff Merkley (D) may never actually materialize, in part because it’s not a sure thing that Monica Wehby (R), a physician who is the candidate Republicans talk up the most here, will advance from her primary. One other reason to doubt Republican hopes here, Democrats say, is a formidable Democratic ground game that maximizes the state’s mail balloting, and the turnout drops between midterms and general elections in Oregon aren’t as severe as they are in some other places (which is to the Democrats’ benefit).

All others: One could make the case that Hawaii could be a long-shot Republican target, but that would depend on a perfect storm of a devastatingly divisive Democratic primary between Sen. Brian Schatz (D) and Rep. Colleen Hanabusa (D, HI-1). The other Democratic seats are safe even in a wave scenario.

The Republicans’ dangerous duo

1. Georgia: Democrats probably can only win the open seat in Georgia if Republicans nominate a poor candidate here, like firebreathing Reps. Paul Broun (R, GA-10) or Phil Gingrey (R, GA-11), both of whom are capable of kicking away a race with cringe-worthy verbal missteps. Michelle Nunn (D) would undoubtedly prefer to face one of them, although Republicans are hopeful that neither candidate could survive an eventual runoff against an establishment candidate such as Rep. Jack Kingston (R, GA-1). A post-November runoff if no one gets over 50% here in the general election is possible. Imagine if Georgia and Louisiana went to overtime, with the Senate in the balance? Georgia’s runoff wouldn’t be until Jan. 6, 2015 -- after the new Congress will be seated. Hmm...

2. Kentucky: Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R) suffered another stumble in his awkward dance with the Tea Party during the Conservative Political Action Conference last week, when he brandished a gun on stage, prompting multiple comparisons to Michael Dukakis’s 1988 tank ride. So it goes with McConnell, who is exactly the kind of insider that insurgent Republicans dislike. That said, there’s little indication that McConnell is in much danger against primary challenger Matt Bevin (R). A general election contest against Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes (D) won’t be easy, but we continue to believe the overall environment ultimately favors McConnell, even if he suffers from poor approval ratings. Republicans believe that McC onnell, who is running about even with Grimes, is at his lowest possible point, and that he’ll pick up lost Republican support after the primary. Democrats hope that McConnell’s position is terminal. We have been bullish on McConnell for awhile now and continue to hold firm on our Likely Republican rating of his race, but if his numbers don’t improve in the summertime, he may be in for a downgrade.

All others: Democrats got a rare bit of good Senate news recently when ex-Rep. Travis Childers (D) entered the Mississippi race. We’re keeping the rating here at Safe Republican, but if Sen. Thad Cochran (R) somehow loses the primary and if state Sen. Chris McDaniel (R) makes serious mistakes as a general election nominee then maybe the race becomes competitive.

At this point, every incumbent Republican senator is favored for re-nomination despite a spate of noteworthy primary challenges to incumbents. Even if there are upsets, Childers seems like the only Democratic nominee who could capitalize in a general election.

Conclusion: Putting it all together

Table 1 below puts these 16 races in order of how likely we think they are to flip parties.

Table 1: Senate races ordered by likelihood of switching parties

So the 10 races we judge likeliest to change parties in November are all currently held by Democrats.

Obviously, a lot can and will change. Democrats have to hope that Republicans continue their multiple-cycle trend of blowing winnable races by nominating bad candidates: The likeliest places for that to happen are Georgia, Iowa and North Carolina. Any improvement in President Obama’s approval rating would also help, and it remains interesting that despite the president’s weak numbers, Democrats are typically tied or slightly ahead on most generic ballot surveys measuring voter preferences in the House, which can also reflect the national sentiment in Senate races.

That might end up being thin gruel for many Democrats, particularly Senate candidates and incumbents in Red states, but it could also lead to an election that is less about a big wave and more about certain Republican-leaning states aligning their senators with their presidential preference. That’s a dynamic we’ve seen in the House, where the number of Democrats representing Republican districts, and vice versa, has declined significantly.

If that’s all that happens in 2014, Republicans trumpeting the election as a mandate-making wave will do so at their own peril for 2016’s more substantial, higher-turnout, across-the-map national battle.


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Latest Analysis of 2016

Christie Slips A Bit

Kyle Kondik, Univ. of Virginia Ctr. for Politics

“It is not only the loneliest job in the world -- it is one of continual soulsearching and of deep and sustained thought. A president is in the grip of events that never seem to let go. He is in every sense the captor of the most exacting office in the gift of a free people. But with all that, it is a wonderful and indescribable experience. It is exasperating and exhilarating. It is a moment in history that enables a man to serve mankind in a broad and comprehensive way and to shape the course of the world towards a happier existence and its hope for a life in peace.”

-- Harry Truman, December 1963









For all the groaning about the permanent presidential campaign, the Neverending Story is valuable in this regard: The job is so important and so powerful that potential aspirants require a thorough vetting that does -- and arguably should -- begin many years in advance. An individual seeking a position whose occupant is “in the grip of events that never seem to let go” -- as former President Truman put it in this excellent description above, reprinted from a newspaper column Truman wrote questioning the size and scope of the CIA -- must show his or her capacity for the office. And the public should get all the information it can about the contenders in order to have the opportunity to make an informed choice.

Thus, it’s with an eye toward helping to participate in that grand mission -- and certainly not just because we think it is fun (wink wink) -- that we make some tweaks to our lists of presidential contenders for 2016.

The Republicans: Wide open opportunity

It’s hard not to think about the permanent campaign when assessing what is the biggest political story of 2014 so far, Gov. Chris Christie’s (R-NJ) scandal involving lane closures on the George Washington Bridge connecting New Jersey to New York. Christie continues to aggressively deny any involvement in the decision to close the lanes. The Bridge Affair -- we’re really trying to avoid calling it “Bridgegate” -- undoubtedly makes Christie weaker now than he was a couple months ago when he was basking in the warm sunshine of a walkover reelection. Still, we’re not ready to say that his national aspirations are doomed.

We bumped Christie down a peg in our Republican presidential ratings, but we still are putting him in our top tier. Gov. Scott Walker (R-WI) leads our list, as he has since we introduced it last year. In reality, though, this is a completely wide-open field with no one even approaching frontrunner status.

Table 1: 2016 Crystal Ball Republican presidential ratings

First Tier


Key Advantages

Key Disadvantages

Since Last Update

Scott Walker
Governor, WI

•Midwest GOP governor in Obama state
•Heroic conservative credentials
•Shown political durability

•Too bland? Next Pawlenty?
•Might not deliver home state
•Would highly motivate left/labor

Rand Paul
Senator, KY

•Tea Party favorite
•Strong support from libertarian GOP wing
•National ID and fundraising network

•Too libertarian?
•Association with out-of-mainstream father
•Too dovish/eclectic for GOP tastes?

Chris ChristieGovernor, NJ

•Dynamic speaker
•Shown ability to pursue mainly conservative agenda in Blue state
•Could bridge criticism by media rally right to his aid?

•Bridge scandal still playing out
•Bullying and staff questions
•Not conservative enough for base?

Second Tier

Marco Rubio
Senator, FL

•Dynamic speaker and politician
•From most electorally valuable swing state

•Future tough votes in Senate; has and will have federal record 
•Vetting issues regarding family 
•Could he really deliver more Hispanic votes?

Ted Cruz
Senator, TX

•Tea Party favorite
•Texas and small-dollar fundraising
•Conservative voting record

•Too extreme? One word: Shutdown.
•Disliked on both sides of the Senate aisle
•Eligibility questions

John Kasich
Governor, OH

•Swing state
•Long conservative record
•Could be fallback for GOP establishment forces

•Supported Medicaid expansion
•Makes verbal miscues, lots of video from time as Fox host
•Abrasive personality

Wild Cards?

Jeb Bush
Ex-Governor, FL

•Strong gubernatorial resume
•Hispanic connections
•Key swing state
•National Bush money and organization

•Wrong last name (Bush dynasty) -- although Clinton dynasty could neutralize this
•George W. Bush's record?

Paul RyanRepresentative, WI

•2012 VP candidate -- next in line?
•General election experience
•Strong conservative record

•May not want to run, possibly positioning self for future in House
•Couldn't help Romney carry WI
•Not a dynamic campaigner

Mike Huckabee 
Ex-Governor, AR

•Governing experience
•Blue collar appeal
•Strong support from social conservatives
•Southerner in Southern-centered party

•Disliked by economic conservatives
•Small fundraising base


Rick Santorum
Ex-Senator, PA

•Strong support from social conservatives
•2nd place finisher in '12 -- next in line?
•Been around primary track

•Lost last Senate race by 17 points
•Chip-on-shoulder attitude
•Small fundraising base

Rick Perry
Governor, TX

•Strong conservative credentials
•Texas fundraising
•Extensive executive experience

•Ran very poor 2012 race 
•“Oops,” we forgot the rest


We continue to like Walker’s combination of Blue state electoral success and conservative bona fides, but let’s face it: We have little idea how he would handle the crucible of a national campaign. That is just unknowable at this point. Walker’s potential as a candidate comes in part because, as a governor, he doesn’t have to weigh in all the time on divisive national issues -- something he won’t necessarily be able to get away with in 2015 if he becomes a candidate. It seems like an odd comparison, but Walker might end up being like Gov. Rick Perry (R-TX), who had all the makings of being a great candidate until he actually became one. Tim Pawlenty (R), the former Minnesota governor whose shiny candidacy went up in smoke quickly, is another comparison that Walker and his allies surely wouldn’t welcome. And of course Walker needs to win reelection -- we rate him a solid favorite but he’s not likely to win by a big, Christie-esque number -- or all this talk is moot. We like Walker’s potential as a candidate, but just because he tops our list doesn’t make him the frontrunner: This is a very big and fluid field.

Perhaps competing with Walker for oxygen will be Gov. John Kasich (R-OH), who is in a similar position to Walker -- he appears likely to win a second term in November -- and who we believe is eager to throw his hat in the ring, as he did, briefly, in the 2000 cycle. He has moved up our list slightly since our previous update. One big potential liability is his support of Medicaid expansion in Ohio, which Walker has largely resisted. Any connection with Obamacare in 2016 could be a kiss of death in a GOP primary, although it didn’t kill Mitt Romney in 2012. (As for Romney running again in 2016, forget about it.)

While it’s hard to see him actually winning the nomination, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) now occupies the second slot on our board. Despite his protests that he’s just 50-50 on running, it seems likelier than not that Paul would throw his hat in the ring to provide a different voice in the primary field -- particularly by offering a more dovish approach to foreign affairs and the national security state, not unlike the role his father played in the 2008 and 2012 nominating process (although the son is more of a conventional Republican than his father). Paul would probably be competing for the same segment of primary voters as Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) if they were both in the field. We like Paul’s chances a bit better than Cruz, although if one believes that support/endorsements from party leaders are important -- and there’s evidence to suggest they are -- it’s difficult to imagine either Paul or Cruz getting much backing from party bigwigs.

Rather, we suspect the so-called establishment would prefer Christie, provided his candidacy is not, pardon the pun, a Bridge Too Far. The Bush family, and many others, wanted Christie to run in 2012, but he demurred. If Christie is not a viable candidate in 2016, there are rumors that former Gov. Jeb Bush (R-FL), son and brother to presidents, would consider entering the contest. The same might be true of Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), Mitt Romney’s former running mate who is widely respected in GOP circles. Ryan was another potential candidate who took a pass on the race last time. He seems like an even more reluctant candidate than Bush. Ryan might prefer holding on to his relatively safe seat and ascending in the House to launching a presidential candidacy. Also worth mentioning: former Gov. Mike Huckabee (R-AR), who has made some noise about running. We’ll believe he’s running only after he makes the official announcement, but he’s been through this game before -- an important rite of passage for many eventual GOP nominees (see: Romney, John McCain, Bob Dole, Ronald Reagan, etc.) -- and is a culturally conservative Southerner in a party that has as one of its pillars a culturally conservative Southern bloc.

We’ve made a special category for two 2012 retreads: Perry and former Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA). They both appear to be taking steps toward running, but their best chances of winning would appear to have come and gone.

Gov. Bobby Jindal (R-LA), whose national star seems to be fading as he faces unpopularity at home, moves off this list.

Lurking in the middle of our ratings is Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), who doesn’t enjoy the same kind of buzz that he did in 2012 or early 2013 but who now might be a bit underrated as a contender. Rubio’s considerable political talents aren’t negated by reaching for a bottled water or getting twisted in knots by immigration -- he could still be a formidable 2016 contender, even if the national spotlight has moved on to others. In the early stages of a presidential campaign, sometimes it’s better to avoid the limelight. Just ask Christie. Or a certain Democrat...

The Democrats: The value of a primary

...Hillary Clinton. Being considered the frontrunner in 2008 obviously wasn’t enough to win her the nomination, and one wonders if all the attention Clinton is getting -- from magazine covers to a laser-like focus on every word or tweet she utters -- will ultimately make voters tire of her, and perhaps even clamor for an alternative in the Democratic primary.

To be clear: Clinton is a big favorite for the nomination if she wants it. Granted, early polls aren’t worth much, but Clinton has a staggering lead right now: According to the HuffPost Pollster average, Clinton is at 68% in national Democratic surveys (Vice President Joe Biden is second at a measly 10%). Clinton was a favorite in 2008, too, but her performance in national polls around this time eight years ago generally only put her in the 30s or low 40s. Her position is seemingly so strong that other Democrats could defer to her: That’s why in Table 2, our rating of the Democratic candidates, we list some credible candidates in the “won’t run against Hillary” category. There's not much to say about these possibilities beyond that.

Table 2: 2016 Crystal Ball Democratic presidential ratings

First Tier


Key Advantages

Key Disadvantages

Since Last Update

Hillary Clinton 
Ex-Secretary of State

•Popular nationally and within party
•Woman: chance to make history
•Can potentially scare away most/all strong opponents if she runs (unlike '08)

•Age (69 by Election Day '16)
•Ran unfocused, too-many-cooks '08 campaign and now appears to be making similar early mistakes
•Keeping Bill in check -- and on the porch
•Peaking too soon? Already dominating headlines day after day

Second Tier

Joe Biden
Vice President

•Vast experience 
•Next in line? 
•VP bully pulpit

•Age (already 71)
•Gaffe machine
•Poor presidential campaign history

Third Tier

Martin O'MalleyGovernor, MD

•Willing and very available
•Strong liberal record and policy achievements

•Baltimore/Maryland baggage
•Nationally unknown
•Maryland Obamacare troubles

Brian Schweitzer
Ex-Governor, MT

•Unique populist personality
•Very popular Dem in Red state

•Unique personality
•Too unpredictable?
•Too conservative on guns, environment?

Would Only Run If Clinton Doesn't

Elizabeth Warren
Senator, MA

•Adored by Dem activists
•Woman -- same history-making potential as Clinton
•National ID and fundraising network

•Electable in a general election? Ran several points behind Obama in MA
•'12 campaign baggage
•Another Bay State Dem?

Andrew CuomoGovernor, NY

•Very popular at home
•Impressive policy record already
•State/Fed experience

•Too conventional?
•Some liberals unhappy
•Another Northeasterner?

Mark Warner
Senator, VA

•Strong executive record
•Key swing state
•Crossover appeal/ bipartisanship theme
•Rich and well-financed

•Too moderate?
•No national constituency
•Not a dynamic speaker

Kirsten GillibrandSenator, NY

•Woman -- same history-making potential as Clinton
•Fairly strong liberal record
•NY fundraising base

•Bland persona
•Nationally unknown
•Past NRA support?

Wild Card?

Howard Dean Ex-Governor, VT

•Could attract grassroots support
•Former DNC chair, can raise money

•Yesterday's news?


That said, as one of us pointed out in a recent Politico Magazine piece, it’s historically rare for a non-incumbent president to simply waltz to a major-party presidential nomination. The only postwar non-incumbent to do so was Vice President Richard Nixon (R), who nonetheless had to mollify potential challenger Gov. Nelson Rockefeller (R-NY) right before the 1960 GOP convention. History suggests Clinton will face at least some opposition in the primary fight -- in fact, Democrats would be foolish to give her a free pass, if only to force her to gear up for the fall and, as Jonathan Bernstein of Bloomberg View astutely argues, for the party to have an actual primary debate about its future.

At this point, there are a handful of possibilities to challenge Clinton: The most obvious is Vice President Joe Biden (D), who is contemplating his last rodeo. Gov. Martin O’Malley (D-MD) is apparently not waiting for Clinton as he ponders a bid, and he’ll have plenty of time on his hands once he leaves office after the 2014 elections (he is term-limited). A couple of former governors who have little use for the party establishment -- Brian Schweitzer of Montana and, appearing on our list as a new wild card, Howard Dean of Vermont -- might also try to rock the boat. None of them seem like particularly strong competitors to Clinton right now, although they all are current or former relatively prominent Democratic officehold ers.

Dropping off the list is Gov. John Hickenlooper (D-CO), who at this point needs to survive his reelection bid before he can entertain any long-shot run at the presidency.

If Clinton isn’t in the field, rip up this list -- a lot of other names will emerge. Like the ultimate effect of Christie’s bridge headaches, the shape of the Democratic field, with or without Clinton, remains murk

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Presidents and the Security/Liberty Debate

John Harwood (NY Times)

WASHINGTON — In his first Inaugural Address, President Obama stirred liberals by proclaiming that “we reject as false the choice between our safety and ideals.”

Five years in, the presidency has taught Mr. Obama that the choice he rejected is not so false after all. Ever since the disclosures about the extent of National Security Agency surveillance, leading to the changes that Mr. Obama plans to announce in a speech on Friday, a chastened president has embraced “balance” between competing imperatives of security and civil liberties.

History shows that is what the Oval Office does to everyone who occupies it. The grinding reality of governing the country nearly always gives the lie to the facile, I-can-square-the-circle formulations that winning candidates carry with them into the White House.

A tour through recent history shows Mr. Obama with plenty of company.Those formulations typically stem from candidates’ attempts to please all sides in contentious debates by acknowledging the concerns of opponents without surrendering their own principles. But it is rarely that easy.

When John F. Kennedy was campaigning for the White House and trying to counter concerns about his youth and inexperience as compared to his opponent, Richard M. Nixon, the two-term vice president, he ran as a fierce Cold Warrior who would close a “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Once elected, he vowed in his Inaugural Address to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe” in the nation’s defense.

Within three months, Kennedy had begun to distance himself from the idea that the missile gap even existed. (Intelligence showed that the United States was much better armed.) And he had, to his own and the nation’s embarrassment, withdrawn air cover for American-trained Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs.

Four years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson tried to calm turbulence beneath the surface of postwar America while pursuing an ambitious civil rights, health care and antipoverty agenda. “The day and the time are here to achieve progress without strife, to achieve change without hatred, not without difference of opinion but without the deep and abiding divisions which scar the union for generations,” he said.

Johnson achieved much of the progress and change he sought, but with steadily escalating strife and divisions that persist today in America’s polarized political system.

In 1968, Nixon won as a candidate hard-nosed enough to calm riotous streets. But while promising “decent order” in his first inaugural address, he also sought to blunt his reputation as “Tricky Dick” by citing “the better angels our nature” — words from Abraham Lincoln’s first Inaugural Address — as an answer to the nation’s “crisis of the spirit.”

Five years later, Nixon resigned in disgrace over the Watergate scandal.

President Ronald Reagan insisted that he could cut taxes and the deficit at the same time, but he accomplished the former as deficits ballooned. His successor, President George Bush, pledged to curb the deficit while preserving Mr. Reagan’s tax cuts, but he ended up abandoning his no-new-taxes pledge to achieve a budget deal with congressional Democrats.

President Bill Clinton vowed to “invest more in our own people” while also cutting “our massive debt.” He left office with a budget surplus for the first time in a generation, but Congress made him set aside many of the investments.

As a self-described “compassionate conservative,” President George W. Bush advocated tax cuts while at the same time describing antipoverty work as a biblical imperative. “When we see that wounded traveler on the road to Jericho,” Mr. Bush told his first inaugural audience, “we will not pass to the other side.”

Mr. Bush proved far more successful on tax cutting than poverty fighting, and the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, soon transformed Mr. Bush’s agenda into that of a wartime president.

The controversies accompanying Mr. Bush’s emphasis on security — the Iraq war, the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the National Security Agency’s surveillance — ignited strong Democratic opposition. But while Mr. Obama capitalized on the backlash against Mr. Bush’s security policies when he ran in the 2008 election, Mr. Obama also needed to assure Americans he could keep them safe.

In practice, Mr. Obama has continued and in some cases expanded many of the previous administration’s security policies, from striking foes with drone aircraft to maintaining the Guantánamo facility to preserving far-reaching N.S.A. surveillance.

If that represents a source of satisfaction to conservatives like former Vice President Dick Cheney, it has angered Mr. Obama’s liberal base as well as a rising band of libertarian Republicans, among them Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky.

Mr. Obama’s position reflects the lesson that Johnson alluded to in his memoirs. His father had told him no man could understand parenthood until becoming a parent, Johnson wrote, and he came to think of the presidency the same way.

“Presidents are always going to grow and evolve because of what they learn,” said the presidential historian Michael Beschloss. “A president who does not do that is someone you probably don’t want as president.”

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President's NSA Proposals

(White House document)


 Office of the Press Secretary 

For Immediate Release January 17, 2014 



SUBJECT: Signals Intelligence Activities 


The United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence 

throughout its history to ensure that national security and 

foreign policy decisionmakers have access to timely, accurate, 

and insightful information. 

The collection of signals intelligence is necessary for the 

United States to advance its national security and foreign 

policy interests and to protect its citizens and the citizens of 

its allies and partners from harm. At the same time, signals 

intelligence activities and the possibility that such activities 

may be improperly disclosed to the public pose multiple risks. 

These include risks to: our relationships with other nations, 

including the cooperation we receive from other nations on law 

enforcement, counterterrorism, and other issues; our commercial, 

economic, and financial interests, including a potential loss of 

international trust in U.S. firms and the decreased willingness 

of other nations to participate in international data sharing, 

privacy, and regulatory regimes; the credibility of our 

commitment to an open, interoperable, and secure global 

Internet; and the protection of intelligence sources and 


In addition, our signals intelligence activities must take into 

account that all persons should be treated with dignity and 

respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might 

reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests 

in the handling of their personal information. 

In determining why, whether, when, and how the United States 

conducts signals intelligence activities, we must weigh all of 

these considerations in a context in which information and 

communications technologies are constantly changing. The 

evolution of technology has created a world where communications 

important to our national security and the communications all of 

us make as part of our daily lives are transmitted through the 

same channels. This presents new and diverse opportunities for, 

and challenges with respect to, the collection of intelligence – 

and especially signals intelligence. The United States 

Intelligence Community (IC) has achieved remarkable success in 

developing enhanced capabilities to perform its signals 

intelligence mission in this rapidly changing world, and these 

enhanced capabilities are a major reason we have been able to 

adapt to a dynamic and challenging security environment.1 The 

1 For the purposes of this directive, the terms "Intelligence Community" and 

"elements of the Intelligence Community" shall have the same meaning as they 

do in Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended (Executive Order 


United States must preserve and continue to develop a robust and 

technologically advanced signals intelligence capability to 

protect our security and that of our partners and allies. Our 

signals intelligence capabilities must also be agile enough to 

enable us to focus on fleeting opportunities or emerging crises 

and to address not only the issues of today, but also the issues 

of tomorrow, which we may not be able to foresee. 

Advanced technologies can increase risks, as well as 

opportunities, however, and we must consider these risks when 

deploying our signals intelligence capabilities. The IC 

conducts signals intelligence activities with care and precision 

to ensure that its collection, retention, use, and dissemination 

of signals intelligence account for these risks. In light of 

the evolving technological and geopolitical environment, we must 

continue to ensure that our signals intelligence policies and 

practices appropriately take into account our alliances and 

other partnerships; the leadership role that the United States 

plays in upholding democratic principles and universal human 

rights; the increased globalization of trade, investment, and 

information flows; our commitment to an open, interoperable and 

secure global Internet; and the legitimate privacy and civil 

liberties concerns of U.S. citizens and citizens of other 


Presidents have long directed the acquisition of foreign 

intelligence and counterintelligence2 pursuant to their 

constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and 

to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities as Commander in 

Chief and Chief Executive. They have also provided direction on 

the conduct of intelligence activities in furtherance of these 

authorities and responsibilities, as well as in execution of 

laws enacted by the Congress. Consistent with this historical 

practice, this directive articulates principles to guide why, 

whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals 

intelligence activities for authorized foreign intelligence and 

counterintelligence purposes.3 

Section 1. Principles Governing the Collection of Signals 


Signals intelligence collection shall be authorized and 

conducted consistent with the following principles: 

(a) The collection of signals intelligence shall be 

authorized by statute or Executive Order, proclamation, 

or other Presidential directive, and undertaken in 

2 For the purposes of this directive, the terms "foreign intelligence" and 

"counterintelligence" shall have the same meaning as they have in Executive 

Order 12333. Thus, "foreign intelligence" means "information relating to the 

capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements 

thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international 

terrorists," and "counterintelligence" means "information gathered and 

activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect 

against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations 

conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or 

their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities." 

Executive Order 12333 further notes that "[i]ntelligence includes foreign 

intelligence and counterintelligence." 

3 Unless otherwise specified, this directive shall apply to signals 

intelligence activities conducted in order to collect communications or 

information about communications, except that it shall not apply to signals 

intelligence activities undertaken to test or develop signals intelligence 


(b) Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral 

accordance with the Constitution and applicable statutes, 

Executive Orders, proclamations, and Presidential 



considerations in the planning of U.S. signals 

intelligence activities. The United States shall not 

collect signals intelligence for the purpose of 

suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for 

disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race, 

gender, sexual orientation, or religion. Signals 

intelligence shall be collected exclusively where there 

is a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose 

to support national and departmental missions and not for 

any other purposes. 


(c) The collection of foreign private commercial information 

or trade secrets is authorized only to protect the 

national security of the United States or its partners 

and allies. It is not an authorized foreign intelligence 

or counterintelligence purpose to collect such 

information to afford a competitive advantage4 to U.S. 

companies and U.S. business sectors commercially. 


(d) Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as 

feasible. In determining whether to collect signals 

intelligence, the United States shall consider the 

availability of other information, including from 

diplomatic and public sources. Such appropriate and 

feasible alternatives to signals intelligence should be 



Sec. 2. Limitations on the Use of Signals Intelligence 

Collected in Bulk. 

Locating new or emerging threats and other vital national 

security information is difficult, as such information is often 

hidden within the large and complex system of modern global 

communications. The United States must consequently collect 

signals intelligence in bulk5 in certain circumstances in order 

to identify these threats. Routine communications and 

communications of national security interest increasingly 

transit the same networks, however, and the collection of 

signals intelligence in bulk may consequently result in the 

collection of information about persons whose activities are not 

of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value. The 

United States will therefore impose new limits on its use of 

signals intelligence collected in bulk. These limits are 

intended to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all 

persons, whatever their nationality and regardless of where they 

might reside. 

In particular, when the United States collects nonpublicly 

available signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data 

4 Certain economic purposes, such as identifying trade or sanctions violations 

or government influence or direction, shall not constitute competitive 


5 The limitations contained in this section do not apply to signals 

intelligence data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted 

collection. References to signals intelligence collected in "bulk" mean the 

authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data which, 

due to technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use 

of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.). 

only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1) 

espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign 

powers or their intelligence services against the United States 

and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its 

interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and 

its interests from the development, possession, proliferation, 

or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity 

threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S 

or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats, 

including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the 

other purposes named in this section. In no event may signals 

intelligence collected in bulk be used for the purpose of 

suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent; disadvantaging 

persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual 

orientation, or religion; affording a competitive advantage to 

U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially; or 

achieving any purpose other than those identified in this 


The Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor 

(APNSA), in consultation with the Director of National 

Intelligence (DNI), shall coordinate, on at least an annual 

basis, a review of the permissible uses of signals intelligence 

collected in bulk through the National Security Council 

Principals and Deputies Committee system identified in PPD-1 or 

any successor document. At the end of this review, I will be 

presented with recommended additions to or removals from the 

list of the permissible uses of signals intelligence collected 

in bulk. 

The DNI shall maintain a list of the permissible uses of signals 

intelligence collected in bulk. This list shall be updated as 

necessary and made publicly available to the maximum extent 

feasible, consistent with the national security. 

Sec. 3. Refining the Process for Collecting Signals 


U.S. intelligence collection activities present the potential 

for national security damage if improperly disclosed. Signals 

intelligence collection raises special concerns, given the 

opportunities and risks created by the constantly evolving 

technological and geopolitical environment; the unique nature of 

such collection and the inherent concerns raised when signals 

intelligence can only be collected in bulk; and the risk of 

damage to our national security interests and our law 

enforcement, intelligence-sharing, and diplomatic relationships 

should our capabilities or activities be compromised. It is, 

therefore, essential that national security policymakers 

consider carefully the value of signals intelligence activities 

in light of the risks entailed in conducting these activities. 

To enable this judgment, the heads of departments and agencies 

that participate in the policy processes for establishing 

signals intelligence priorities and requirements shall, on an 

annual basis, review any priorities or requirements identified 

by their departments or agencies and advise the DNI whether each 

should be maintained, with a copy of the advice provided to the 


Additionally, the classified Annex to this directive, which 

supplements the existing policy process for reviewing signals 

intelligence activities, affirms that determinations about 

whether and how to conduct signals intelligence activities must 

carefully evaluate the benefits to our national interests and 

the risks posed by those activities.6 

Sec. 4. Safeguarding Personal Information Collected Through 

Signals Intelligence. 

All persons should be treated with dignity and respect, 

regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside, 

and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the 

handling of their personal information.7 U.S. signals 

intelligence activities must, therefore, include appropriate 

safeguards for the personal information of all individuals, 

regardless of the nationality of the individual to whom the 

information pertains or where that individual resides.

(a) Policies and Procedures. The DNI, in consultation with 

the Attorney General, shall ensure that all elements of 

the IC establish policies and procedures that apply the 

following principles for safeguarding personal 

information collected from signals intelligence 

activities. To the maximum extent feasible consistent 

with the national security, these policies and procedures 

are to be applied equally to the personal information of 

all persons, regardless of nationality:


i. Minimization. The sharing of intelligence that 

contains personal information is necessary to protect 

our national security and advance our foreign policy 

interests, as it enables the United States to 

coordinate activities across our government. At the 

same time, however, by setting appropriate limits on 

such sharing, the United States takes legitimate 

privacy concerns into account and decreases the risks 

that personal information will be misused or 

mishandled. Relatedly, the significance to our 

national security of intelligence is not always 

apparent upon an initial review of information: 

intelligence must be retained for a sufficient period 

of time for the IC to understand its relevance and use 

6 Section 3 of this directive, and the directive's classified Annex, do not 

apply to (1) signals intelligence activities undertaken by or for the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation in support of predicated investigations other than 

those conducted solely for purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence; or (2) 

signals intelligence activities undertaken in support of military operations 

in an area of active hostilities, covert action, or human intelligence 


7 Departments and agencies shall apply the term "personal information" in a 

manner that is consistent for U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons. 

Accordingly, for the purposes of this directive, the term "personal 

information" shall cover the same types of information covered by 

"information concerning U.S. persons" under section 2.3 of Executive Order 


8 The collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning 

"United States persons" is governed by multiple legal and policy 

requirements, such as those required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 

Act and Executive Order 12333. For the purposes of this directive, the term 

"United States person" shall have the same meaning as it does in Executive 

Order 12333. 

9 The policies and procedures of affected elements of the IC shall also be 

consistent with any additional IC policies, standards, procedures, and 

guidance the DNI, in coordination with the Attorney General, the heads of IC 

elements, and the heads of any other departments containing such elements, 

may issue to implement these principles. This directive is not intended to 

alter the rules applicable to U.S. persons in Executive Order 12333, the 

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or other applicable law. 

it to meet our national security needs. However, 

long-term storage of personal information unnecessary 

to protect our national security is inefficient, 

unnecessary, and raises legitimate privacy concerns. 

Accordingly, IC elements shall establish policies and 

procedures reasonably designed to minimize the 

dissemination and retention of personal information 

collected from signals intelligence activities. 


 Dissemination: Personal information shall be 

 Retention: Personal information shall be retained 

disseminated only if the dissemination of comparable 

information concerning U.S. persons would be 

permitted under section 2.3 of Executive Order 



only if the retention of comparable information 

concerning U.S. persons would be permitted under 

section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 and shall be 

subject to the same retention periods as applied to 

comparable information concerning U.S. persons. 

Information for which no such determination has been 

made shall not be retained for more than 5 years, 

unless the DNI expressly determines that continued 

retention is in the national security interests of 

the United States. 


Additionally, within 180 days of the date of this 

directive, the DNI, in coordination with the 

Attorney General, the heads of other elements of the 

IC, and the heads of departments and agencies 

containing other elements of the IC, shall prepare a 

report evaluating possible additional dissemination 

and retention safeguards for personal information 

collected through signals intelligence, consistent 

with technical capabilities and operational needs. 


ii. Data Security and Access. When our national security 

and foreign policy needs require us to retain certain 

intelligence, it is vital that the United States take 

appropriate steps to ensure that any personal 

information contained within that intelligence is 

secure. Accordingly, personal information shall be 

processed and stored under conditions that provide 

adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized 

persons, consistent with the applicable safeguards for 

sensitive information contained in relevant Executive 

Orders, proclamations, Presidential directives, 

IC directives, and associated policies. Access to 

such personal information shall be limited to 

authorized personnel with a need to know the 

information to perform their mission, consistent with 

the personnel security requirements of relevant 

Executive Orders, IC directives, and associated 

policies. Such personnel will be provided appropriate 

and adequate training in the principles set forth in 

this directive. These persons may access and use the 

information consistent with applicable laws and 

Executive Orders and the principles of this directive; 

personal information for which no determination has 

been made that it can be permissibly disseminated or 

retained under section 4(a)(i) of this directive shall 

be accessed only in order to make such determinations 

(or to conduct authorized administrative, security, 

and oversight functions). 

iii. Data Quality. IC elements strive to provide national 

security policymakers with timely, accurate, and 

insightful intelligence, and inaccurate records and 

reporting can not only undermine our national security 

interests, but also can result in the collection or 

analysis of information relating to persons whose 

activities are not of foreign intelligence or 

counterintelligence value. Accordingly, personal 

information shall be included in intelligence products 

only as consistent with applicable IC standards for 

accuracy and objectivity, as set forth in relevant 

IC directives. Moreover, while IC elements should 

apply the IC Analytic Standards as a whole, particular 

care should be taken to apply standards relating to 

the quality and reliability of the information, 

consideration of alternative sources of information 

and interpretations of data, and objectivity in 

performing analysis. 


iv. Oversight. The IC has long recognized that effective 


oversight is necessary to ensure that we are 

protecting our national security in a manner 

consistent with our interests and values. 

Accordingly, the policies and procedures of IC 

elements, and departments and agencies containing IC 

elements, shall include appropriate measures to 

facilitate oversight over the implementation of 

safeguards protecting personal information, to include 

periodic auditing against the standards required by 

this section. 

The policies and procedures shall also recognize and 

facilitate the performance of oversight by the 

Inspectors General of IC elements, and departments and 

agencies containing IC elements, and other relevant 

oversight entities, as appropriate and consistent with 

their responsibilities. When a significant compliance 

issue occurs involving personal information of any 

person, regardless of nationality, collected as a 

result of signals intelligence activities, the issue 

shall, in addition to any existing reporting 

requirements, be reported promptly to the DNI, who 

shall determine what, if any, corrective actions are 

necessary. If the issue involves a non-United States 

person, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of 

State and the head of the notifying department or 

agency, shall determine whether steps should be taken 

to notify the relevant foreign government, consistent 

with the protection of sources and methods and of U.S. 



(b) Update and Publication. Within 1 year of the date of 

this directive, IC elements shall update or issue new 

policies and procedures as necessary to implement 

section 4 of this directive, in coordination with the 

DNI. To enhance public understanding of, and promote 

public trust in, the safeguards in place to protect 

personal information, these updated or newly issued 

policies and procedures shall be publicly released 

to the maximum extent possible, consistent with 

classification requirements. 


(c) Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Official. To help 

ensure that the legitimate privacy interests all people 

share related to the handling of their personal 

information are appropriately considered in light of the 

principles in this section, the APNSA, the Director of 

the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the 

Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy 

(OSTP) shall identify one or more senior officials who 

will be responsible for working with the DNI, the 

Attorney General, the heads of other elements of the IC, 

and the heads of departments and agencies containing 

other elements of the IC, as appropriate, as they develop 

the policies and procedures called for in this section. 


(d) Coordinator for International Diplomacy. The Secretary 

of State shall identify a senior official within the 

Department of State to coordinate with the responsible 

departments and agencies the United States Government's 

diplomatic and foreign policy efforts related to 

international information technology issues and to serve 

as a point of contact for foreign governments who wish to 

raise concerns regarding signals intelligence activities 

conducted by the United States. 


Sec. 5. Reports. 


(a) Within 180 days of the date of this directive, the DNI 

(b) The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is 

shall provide a status report that updates me on the 

progress of the IC's implementation of section 4 of this 



encouraged to provide me with a report that assesses the 

implementation of any matters contained within this 

directive that fall within its mandate. 


(c) Within 120 days of the date of this directive, the 

President's Intelligence Advisory Board shall provide 

me with a report identifying options for assessing 

the distinction between metadata and other types of 

information, and for replacing the "need-to-share" or 

"need-to-know" models for classified information sharing 

with a Work-Related Access model. 


(d) Within 1 year of the date of this directive, the DNI, in 

coordination with the heads of relevant elements of the 

IC and OSTP, shall provide me with a report assessing the 

feasibility of creating software that would allow the IC 

more easily to conduct targeted information acquisition 

rather than bulk collection. 


Sec. 6. General Provisions. 


(a) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to prevent 

me from exercising my constitutional authority, including 

as Commander in Chief, Chief Executive, and in the 

conduct of foreign affairs, as well as my statutory 

authority. Consistent with this principle, a recipient 

of this directive may at any time recommend to me, 

through the APNSA, a change to the policies and 

procedures contained in this directive. 


(b) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to 

impair or otherwise affect the authority or 

responsibility granted by law to a United States 

Government department or agency, or the head thereof, 

or the functions of the Director of OMB relating to 

budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals. 

This directive is intended to supplement existing 

processes or procedures for reviewing foreign 

intelligence or counterintelligence activities and should 

not be read to supersede such processes and procedures 

unless explicitly stated. 


(c) This directive shall be implemented consistent with 

applicable U.S. law and subject to the availability of 



(d) This directive is not intended to, and does not, create 

any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, 

enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the 

United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, 

its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

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1933: FDR ends the gold standard...