THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 17, 2014
FACT SHEET: Ukraine-Related Sanctions
President Obama today issued a new Executive Order (E.O.) under the national emergency with respect to Ukraine that finds that the actions and policies of the Russian government with respect to Ukraine -– including through the deployment of Russian military forces in the Crimea region of Ukraine –- undermine democratic processes and institutions in Ukraine; threaten its peace, security, stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity; and contribute to the misappropriation of its assets.
This new authority expands upon E.O. 13660, which the President signed less than two weeks ago, by authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to impose sanctions on named officials of the Russian government, any individual or entity that operates in the Russian arms industry, and any designated individual or entity that acts on behalf of, or that provides material or other support to, any senior Russian government official. We have fashioned these sanctions to impose costs on named individuals who wield influence in the Russian government and those responsible for the deteriorating situation in Ukraine. We stand ready to use these authorities in a direct and targeted fashion as events warrant.
In response to the Russian government’s actions contributing to the crisis in Ukraine, this new E.O. lists seven Russian government officials who are being designated for sanctions. These individuals are Vladislav Surkov, Sergey Glazyev, Leonid Slutsky, Andrei Klishas, Valentina Matviyenko, Dmitry Rogozin, and Yelena Mizulina.
The United States also will seek to hold accountable individuals who use their resources or influence to support or act on behalf of senior Russian government officials. We recognize that the Russian leadership derives significant support from, and takes action through, individuals who do not themselves serve in any official capacity. Our current focus is to identify these individuals and target their personal assets, but not companies that they may manage on behalf of the Russian state.
In addition to the new E.O., the Treasury Department today has imposed sanctions on four other individuals under E.O. 13660, issued on March 6, for their actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine and in undermining the Government of Ukraine. They are Crimea-based separatist leaders Sergey Aksyonov and Vladimir Konstantinov; former Ukrainian presidential chief of staff Viktor Medvedchuk; and former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych.
Today’s actions send a strong message to the Russian government thatthere are consequences for their actions that violate the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including their actions supporting the illegal referendum for Crimean separation. The United States, together with international partners, will continue to stand by the Ukrainian government to ensure that costs are imposed on Crimean separatists and their Russian backers. Today’s actions also serve as notice to Russia that unless it abides by its international obligations and returns its military forces to their original bases and respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the United States is prepared to take additional steps to impose further political and economic costs.
· Vladislav Surkov: Surkov is being sanctioned for his status as a Presidential Aide to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
· Sergey Glazyev: Glazyev is being sanctioned for his status as a Presidential Adviser to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
· Leonid Slutsky: Slutsky is being sanctioned for his status as a State Duma deputy, where he is Chairman of the Duma Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration, and Relations with Compatriots.
· Andrei Klishas: Klishas is being sanctioned for his status as a Member of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and as Chairman of the Federation Council Committee of Constitutional Law, Judicial, and Legal Affairs, and the Development of Civil Society.
· Valentina Matviyenko: Matviyenko is being sanctioned for her status as Head of the Federation Council
· Dmitry Rogozin: Rogozin is being sanctioned for his status as the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation.
· Yelena Mizulina: Mizulina is being sanctioned for her status as a State Duma Deputy.
· Sergey Aksyonov: Aksyonov is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes. Aksyonov claims to be the Prime Minister of Crimea and has rejected the authority of the legitimate government in Kyiv.
· Vladimir Konstantinov: Konstantinov is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes. Konstantinov is the speaker of the Crimean parliament, which on March 11, 2014, declared independence from Ukraine.
· Viktor Medvedchuk: Medvedchuk, leader of Ukrainian Choice, is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes. He is also being designated because he has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support to Yanukovych and because he is a leader of an entity that has, or whose members have, engaged in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Ukraine and actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine.
· Viktor Yanukovych: Former Ukrainian President Yanukovych is being designated for threatening the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine, and for undermining Ukraine’s democratic institutions and processes. After abandoning Kyiv and ultimately fleeing to Russia, Viktor Yanukovych called upon Russian President Vladimir Putin to send Russian troops into Ukraine.
To demonstrate just how Republican this year’s Senate playing field is, consider this: Of the 36 Senate elections this year (33 regularly scheduled and three specials), the Crystal Ball sees 16 as at least potentially competitive at the moment. Of those races, 14 are currently held by Democrats, and just two are held by Republicans.
In other words, nearly all the competitive seats this cycle are in places where Democrats are playing defense. That fact alone indicates the GOP is poised for a strong cycle, although we’re not ready to say they will in fact win the six seats they need to take outright control of the Senate, even though they have a path to six -- or perhaps even several seats more than that. Democrats, meanwhile, would do quite well to hold the GOP to a net gain of three or four seats. Such are the perils of holding the White House in a midterm election on the best GOP Senate map of the three classes contested once every six years.
It’s possible that the Republicans will pick up the Senate even if 2014 is not a “wave” election: In fact, the likeliest election outcome at this point seems to be Republicans gaining something close to their needed number of Senate seats (five or six or so), but adding only a similar number of seats to their House majority and actually losing a few net governorships. That would make 2014 like 1986, a midterm year where Democrats captured the Senate in President Reagan’s “sixth-year itch” election, but picked up fewer seats in the House than they did in the Senate (five in the lower chamber versus eight in the upper) and actually lost eight net governorships. (We detailed the 1986 comparisons in depth earlier this cycle.)
In this Senate update, we wanted to quickly sum up the state of play in all the competitive races, but also give a sense of which seats are likeliest to change party hands. Our current ratings suggest that Republicans are at least slightly favored in four Democratic-held seats (Arkansas, Montana, South Dakota and West Virginia); have about even odds in another three (Alaska, Louisiana and North Carolina); and -- stretching here -- under near-perfect conditions could potentially compete in or even flip up to an additional seven seats beyond that (Colorado, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Oregon and Virginia). Meanwhile, Democrats have outside shots in Georgia, Kentucky and perhaps -- if absolutely everything broke right for them -- Mississippi.
The following is our best guess as to how these dominoes would fall in November, ordered from likeliest to unlikeliest to flip parties. Let’s start with the long list of Democrats, followed by the Republicans, and then an overall ranking of all 16 competitive states.
Map 1: Crystal Ball Senate ratings
Democratic dominoes, listed in order of how likely they are to flip to the GOP
1. South Dakota: Any path to victory for Rick Weiland (D), the Tom Daschle protégé who is running here to replace retiring Sen. Tim Johnson (D), probably involves former Republican Sen. Larry Pressler, an independent in this race, cutting into ex-Gov. Mike Rounds’ (R) GOP support. However, it seems just as likely that Pressler will end up drawing votes from Weiland. In any event, this pretty clearly has been and remains the easiest Republican pickup in the country.
2. West Virginia: Some Republicans fret about a massive Democratic registered-voter edge in the Mountain State as well as the notable fact that the GOP hasn’t won a Senate race here since the 1950s, even as the state has swung heavily Republican over the last four presidential elections. Republicans also worry that West Virginia, a small state with generally cheap media markets (with the exception of the eastern panhandle, which is covered by the pricey Washington, D.C. market), looks like some of the other low-population, cheap media states where they have frittered away winnable Senate races in recent years (like Montana and North Dakota). All that said, Rep. Shelley Moore Capito (R, WV-2) looks like the right person to break the GOP dry spell here, even as Secretary of State Natalie Tennant (D) mounts a credible defense of the retiring Sen. Jay Rockefeller’s (D) seat. We’re keeping this race in the Leans Republican column for now, but it’s much closer to moving to the Likely Republican column than to Toss-up.
3. Montana: With now-Ambassador Max Baucus headed to China, Gov. Steve Bullock (D) appointed John Walsh (D), his former lieutenant governor, to a Senate seat that Republicans have never held since the passage of the 17th Amendment. Our sources in Montana believe Walsh still has a lot to prove, and the new incumbent continues to have some primary trouble: John Bohlinger (D), ex-Gov. Brian Schweitzer’s (D) former lieutenant governor, is continuing his challenge to Walsh. Put it all together and Rep. Steve Daines (R, MT-AL), who should be fine in his primary, remains a favorite even though he is now running against an incumbent.
4. Arkansas: Sen. Mark Pryor (D) didn’t do himself any favors the other day by saying that his opponent, Rep. Tom Cotton (R, AR-4), has a “sense of entitlement” because of his military service. A mistake like this is often overrated, although it’s not helpful for Pryor, who is already an underdog in Red-trending Arkansas. It’s fair to wonder if Pryor, who basically got a free pass in 2008, is really in prime fighting shape, although Cotton’s fairly outspoken economic conservatism in a state that is more Mike Huckabee than Paul Ryan provides an opening to the incumbent.
5. North Carolina: The fifth slot on these rankings could just as easily be one of our two other Toss-ups (Alaska and Louisiana), but we’re going with Sen. Kay Hagan (D) as the most vulnerable of the three. Hagan’s approval ratings are poor according to several recent polls, and while she is a very strong fundraiser, Democrats have to be worried about her performance as a candidate. State House Speaker Thom Tillis (R) needs to improve his fundraising, though, and he hasn’t yet put away his primary competitors: Tea Party Sen. Mike Lee (R- UT) recently joined Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) in endorsing physician Greg Brannon in the GOP primary, even though a jury recently found that Brannon had misled investors to a now-defunct technology company. Brannon or someone else other than Tillis could be a real problem for the GOP in the general election, though Tillis isn’t perfect either.
6. Alaska: Speaking of primaries, it’s been fascinating to watch the GOP contest in Alaska, where Lt. Gov. Mead Treadwell (R) started as the favorite but has been such a mess that the nomination is now former state Department of Natural Resources Commissioner Dan Sullivan’s (R) to lose. In fact, a couple Republican operatives separately told us that if Treadwell continues on in the primary, the distraction could cost Sullivan the seat. Also planning to run in the August primary is Joe Miller, the Republican nominee who lost to Sen. Lisa Murkowski’s (R) write-in campaign in 2010. GOP leaders aren’t worried about Miller winning the nomination, but a three-way race could further bog down Sullivan. Meanwhile, Sen. Mark Begich (D) is, we believe, a formidable incumbent whose biggest problem remains the Last Frontier’s significant Republican lean.
7. Louisiana: The likeliest outcome in this race is probably overtime: A couple minor Republican candidates could prevent Rep. Bill Cassidy (R, LA-6) from finishing ahead of Sen. Mary Landrieu (D) in the November election, but if he can hold her under 50% -- and Landrieu is currently only polling in the low-to-mid 40s -- there will be a December runoff that could potentially decide the Senate. It’s our feeling, and the belief of some of our Republican contacts, that this is the heaviest lift for the GOP in the seven states won by Mitt Romney in 2012 that are represented by Democrats on this year’s Senate map (those states are the ones listed one through seven on this list).
8. Michigan: Some characterize this race as a Toss-up, but we’re not there yet. Yes, former Secretary of State Terri Lynn Land (R) has performed admirably so far, and national Republicans in particular seem to be pleasantly surprised after they unsuccessfully tried to get other candidates to enter. But Democrats (and even a Republican or two) argue that Land has run a sheltered race and that she will be exposed as a poor candidate, to the benefit of Rep. Gary Peters (D, MI-14). Michigan’s Democratic tilt in federal races is a factor, too -- though in the right year (such as 1994) it can be overcome.
9. Iowa: We get the sense that national Republicans favor state Sen. Joni Ernst (R), who was recently endorsed by Mitt Romney, to be their nominee here. However, Ernst hasn’t raised a ton of money and might have trouble winning the nomination. Mark Jacobs (R), a wealthy businessman who might also turn out to be a decent general election candidate, probably stands out with Ernst as the other top contender. If no one breaks 35% in a primary, anything could happen in an ensuing convention, including the nomination of a candidate ill-equipped to seriously challenge Rep. Bruce Braley (D, IA-1). With the right GOP nominee, this race could be a better Republican target than Michigan; with the wrong one, national Republicans might just write it off. One candidate we hear could be well positioned at a GOP convention is Sam Clovis, a radio host and college professor.
10. Colorado: After the entrance of Rep. Cory Gardner (R, CO-4), we moved this race from Likely Democratic to Leans Democratic. But despite Gardner stepping up against Sen. Mark Udall (D), the incumbent is a strong candidate with a golden last name. This race is more competitive than it was, but it -- like Iowa and Michigan -- is not a Toss-up as of yet.
11. New Hampshire: Simply put: If the Granite State Hamlet (former Republican Sen. Scott Brown of Massachusetts) gets in this race, it moves up this list. If he doesn’t, it moves down. Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D) would remain the starting favorite in any event, but a Brown candidacy would be a late development even more significant than Gardner’s entry in Colorado.
12. Minnesota: Given his narrow win in 2008, Sen. Al Franken (D) should probably be more vulnerable than he is, although Republicans hope that businessman Mike McFadden (R) could make a run at him. It’s not obvious, though, that McFadden will get through the GOP primary; state Sen. Julianne Ortman (R) beat him in a recent straw poll.
13. Virginia: Former Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie’s (R) respectable but long-shot challenge to Sen. Mark Warner (D) could benefit if some of the other races listed above fizzle for Republicans: The party has an embarrassment of riches in terms of targets, but national dollars might more readily flow here if Republican challenges in states like Iowa, New Hampshire and Minnesota don’t materialize. Then again, the proliferation of outside money groups on the GOP side might end up providing more than enough money to fund a baker’s dozen races -- and Gillespie should be able to raise a decent amount on his own. Warner remains very formidable, and if he somehow loses, it won’t be because he didn’t have the cash to compete.
14. Oregon: A credible GOP challenge to Sen. Jeff Merkley (D) may never actually materialize, in part because it’s not a sure thing that Monica Wehby (R), a physician who is the candidate Republicans talk up the most here, will advance from her primary. One other reason to doubt Republican hopes here, Democrats say, is a formidable Democratic ground game that maximizes the state’s mail balloting, and the turnout drops between midterms and general elections in Oregon aren’t as severe as they are in some other places (which is to the Democrats’ benefit).
All others: One could make the case that Hawaii could be a long-shot Republican target, but that would depend on a perfect storm of a devastatingly divisive Democratic primary between Sen. Brian Schatz (D) and Rep. Colleen Hanabusa (D, HI-1). The other Democratic seats are safe even in a wave scenario.
The Republicans’ dangerous duo
1. Georgia: Democrats probably can only win the open seat in Georgia if Republicans nominate a poor candidate here, like firebreathing Reps. Paul Broun (R, GA-10) or Phil Gingrey (R, GA-11), both of whom are capable of kicking away a race with cringe-worthy verbal missteps. Michelle Nunn (D) would undoubtedly prefer to face one of them, although Republicans are hopeful that neither candidate could survive an eventual runoff against an establishment candidate such as Rep. Jack Kingston (R, GA-1). A post-November runoff if no one gets over 50% here in the general election is possible. Imagine if Georgia and Louisiana went to overtime, with the Senate in the balance? Georgia’s runoff wouldn’t be until Jan. 6, 2015 -- after the new Congress will be seated. Hmm...
2. Kentucky: Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R) suffered another stumble in his awkward dance with the Tea Party during the Conservative Political Action Conference last week, when he brandished a gun on stage, prompting multiple comparisons to Michael Dukakis’s 1988 tank ride. So it goes with McConnell, who is exactly the kind of insider that insurgent Republicans dislike. That said, there’s little indication that McConnell is in much danger against primary challenger Matt Bevin (R). A general election contest against Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes (D) won’t be easy, but we continue to believe the overall environment ultimately favors McConnell, even if he suffers from poor approval ratings. Republicans believe that McC onnell, who is running about even with Grimes, is at his lowest possible point, and that he’ll pick up lost Republican support after the primary. Democrats hope that McConnell’s position is terminal. We have been bullish on McConnell for awhile now and continue to hold firm on our Likely Republican rating of his race, but if his numbers don’t improve in the summertime, he may be in for a downgrade.
All others: Democrats got a rare bit of good Senate news recently when ex-Rep. Travis Childers (D) entered the Mississippi race. We’re keeping the rating here at Safe Republican, but if Sen. Thad Cochran (R) somehow loses the primary and if state Sen. Chris McDaniel (R) makes serious mistakes as a general election nominee then maybe the race becomes competitive.
At this point, every incumbent Republican senator is favored for re-nomination despite a spate of noteworthy primary challenges to incumbents. Even if there are upsets, Childers seems like the only Democratic nominee who could capitalize in a general election.
Conclusion: Putting it all together
Table 1 below puts these 16 races in order of how likely we think they are to flip parties.
Table 1: Senate races ordered by likelihood of switching parties
So the 10 races we judge likeliest to change parties in November are all currently held by Democrats.
Obviously, a lot can and will change. Democrats have to hope that Republicans continue their multiple-cycle trend of blowing winnable races by nominating bad candidates: The likeliest places for that to happen are Georgia, Iowa and North Carolina. Any improvement in President Obama’s approval rating would also help, and it remains interesting that despite the president’s weak numbers, Democrats are typically tied or slightly ahead on most generic ballot surveys measuring voter preferences in the House, which can also reflect the national sentiment in Senate races.
That might end up being thin gruel for many Democrats, particularly Senate candidates and incumbents in Red states, but it could also lead to an election that is less about a big wave and more about certain Republican-leaning states aligning their senators with their presidential preference. That’s a dynamic we’ve seen in the House, where the number of Democrats representing Republican districts, and vice versa, has declined significantly.
If that’s all that happens in 2014, Republicans trumpeting the election as a mandate-making wave will do so at their own peril for 2016’s more substantial, higher-turnout, across-the-map national battle.
Christie Slips A Bit
“It is not only the loneliest job in the world -- it is one of continual soulsearching and of deep and sustained thought. A president is in the grip of events that never seem to let go. He is in every sense the captor of the most exacting office in the gift of a free people. But with all that, it is a wonderful and indescribable experience. It is exasperating and exhilarating. It is a moment in history that enables a man to serve mankind in a broad and comprehensive way and to shape the course of the world towards a happier existence and its hope for a life in peace.”
-- Harry Truman, December 1963
For all the groaning about the permanent presidential campaign, the Neverending Story is valuable in this regard: The job is so important and so powerful that potential aspirants require a thorough vetting that does -- and arguably should -- begin many years in advance. An individual seeking a position whose occupant is “in the grip of events that never seem to let go” -- as former President Truman put it in this excellent description above, reprinted from a newspaper column Truman wrote questioning the size and scope of the CIA -- must show his or her capacity for the office. And the public should get all the information it can about the contenders in order to have the opportunity to make an informed choice.
Thus, it’s with an eye toward helping to participate in that grand mission -- and certainly not just because we think it is fun (wink wink) -- that we make some tweaks to our lists of presidential contenders for 2016.
The Republicans: Wide open opportunity
It’s hard not to think about the permanent campaign when assessing what is the biggest political story of 2014 so far, Gov. Chris Christie’s (R-NJ) scandal involving lane closures on the George Washington Bridge connecting New Jersey to New York. Christie continues to aggressively deny any involvement in the decision to close the lanes. The Bridge Affair -- we’re really trying to avoid calling it “Bridgegate” -- undoubtedly makes Christie weaker now than he was a couple months ago when he was basking in the warm sunshine of a walkover reelection. Still, we’re not ready to say that his national aspirations are doomed.
We bumped Christie down a peg in our Republican presidential ratings, but we still are putting him in our top tier. Gov. Scott Walker (R-WI) leads our list, as he has since we introduced it last year. In reality, though, this is a completely wide-open field with no one even approaching frontrunner status.
Table 1: 2016 Crystal Ball Republican presidential ratings
We continue to like Walker’s combination of Blue state electoral success and conservative bona fides, but let’s face it: We have little idea how he would handle the crucible of a national campaign. That is just unknowable at this point. Walker’s potential as a candidate comes in part because, as a governor, he doesn’t have to weigh in all the time on divisive national issues -- something he won’t necessarily be able to get away with in 2015 if he becomes a candidate. It seems like an odd comparison, but Walker might end up being like Gov. Rick Perry (R-TX), who had all the makings of being a great candidate until he actually became one. Tim Pawlenty (R), the former Minnesota governor whose shiny candidacy went up in smoke quickly, is another comparison that Walker and his allies surely wouldn’t welcome. And of course Walker needs to win reelection -- we rate him a solid favorite but he’s not likely to win by a big, Christie-esque number -- or all this talk is moot. We like Walker’s potential as a candidate, but just because he tops our list doesn’t make him the frontrunner: This is a very big and fluid field.
Perhaps competing with Walker for oxygen will be Gov. John Kasich (R-OH), who is in a similar position to Walker -- he appears likely to win a second term in November -- and who we believe is eager to throw his hat in the ring, as he did, briefly, in the 2000 cycle. He has moved up our list slightly since our previous update. One big potential liability is his support of Medicaid expansion in Ohio, which Walker has largely resisted. Any connection with Obamacare in 2016 could be a kiss of death in a GOP primary, although it didn’t kill Mitt Romney in 2012. (As for Romney running again in 2016, forget about it.)
While it’s hard to see him actually winning the nomination, Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) now occupies the second slot on our board. Despite his protests that he’s just 50-50 on running, it seems likelier than not that Paul would throw his hat in the ring to provide a different voice in the primary field -- particularly by offering a more dovish approach to foreign affairs and the national security state, not unlike the role his father played in the 2008 and 2012 nominating process (although the son is more of a conventional Republican than his father). Paul would probably be competing for the same segment of primary voters as Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) if they were both in the field. We like Paul’s chances a bit better than Cruz, although if one believes that support/endorsements from party leaders are important -- and there’s evidence to suggest they are -- it’s difficult to imagine either Paul or Cruz getting much backing from party bigwigs.
Rather, we suspect the so-called establishment would prefer Christie, provided his candidacy is not, pardon the pun, a Bridge Too Far. The Bush family, and many others, wanted Christie to run in 2012, but he demurred. If Christie is not a viable candidate in 2016, there are rumors that former Gov. Jeb Bush (R-FL), son and brother to presidents, would consider entering the contest. The same might be true of Rep. Paul Ryan (R-WI), Mitt Romney’s former running mate who is widely respected in GOP circles. Ryan was another potential candidate who took a pass on the race last time. He seems like an even more reluctant candidate than Bush. Ryan might prefer holding on to his relatively safe seat and ascending in the House to launching a presidential candidacy. Also worth mentioning: former Gov. Mike Huckabee (R-AR), who has made some noise about running. We’ll believe he’s running only after he makes the official announcement, but he’s been through this game before -- an important rite of passage for many eventual GOP nominees (see: Romney, John McCain, Bob Dole, Ronald Reagan, etc.) -- and is a culturally conservative Southerner in a party that has as one of its pillars a culturally conservative Southern bloc.
We’ve made a special category for two 2012 retreads: Perry and former Sen. Rick Santorum (R-PA). They both appear to be taking steps toward running, but their best chances of winning would appear to have come and gone.
Gov. Bobby Jindal (R-LA), whose national star seems to be fading as he faces unpopularity at home, moves off this list.
Lurking in the middle of our ratings is Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), who doesn’t enjoy the same kind of buzz that he did in 2012 or early 2013 but who now might be a bit underrated as a contender. Rubio’s considerable political talents aren’t negated by reaching for a bottled water or getting twisted in knots by immigration -- he could still be a formidable 2016 contender, even if the national spotlight has moved on to others. In the early stages of a presidential campaign, sometimes it’s better to avoid the limelight. Just ask Christie. Or a certain Democrat...
The Democrats: The value of a primary
...Hillary Clinton. Being considered the frontrunner in 2008 obviously wasn’t enough to win her the nomination, and one wonders if all the attention Clinton is getting -- from magazine covers to a laser-like focus on every word or tweet she utters -- will ultimately make voters tire of her, and perhaps even clamor for an alternative in the Democratic primary.
To be clear: Clinton is a big favorite for the nomination if she wants it. Granted, early polls aren’t worth much, but Clinton has a staggering lead right now: According to the HuffPost Pollster average, Clinton is at 68% in national Democratic surveys (Vice President Joe Biden is second at a measly 10%). Clinton was a favorite in 2008, too, but her performance in national polls around this time eight years ago generally only put her in the 30s or low 40s. Her position is seemingly so strong that other Democrats could defer to her: That’s why in Table 2, our rating of the Democratic candidates, we list some credible candidates in the “won’t run against Hillary” category. There's not much to say about these possibilities beyond that.
Table 2: 2016 Crystal Ball Democratic presidential ratings
That said, as one of us pointed out in a recent Politico Magazine piece, it’s historically rare for a non-incumbent president to simply waltz to a major-party presidential nomination. The only postwar non-incumbent to do so was Vice President Richard Nixon (R), who nonetheless had to mollify potential challenger Gov. Nelson Rockefeller (R-NY) right before the 1960 GOP convention. History suggests Clinton will face at least some opposition in the primary fight -- in fact, Democrats would be foolish to give her a free pass, if only to force her to gear up for the fall and, as Jonathan Bernstein of Bloomberg View astutely argues, for the party to have an actual primary debate about its future.
At this point, there are a handful of possibilities to challenge Clinton: The most obvious is Vice President Joe Biden (D), who is contemplating his last rodeo. Gov. Martin O’Malley (D-MD) is apparently not waiting for Clinton as he ponders a bid, and he’ll have plenty of time on his hands once he leaves office after the 2014 elections (he is term-limited). A couple of former governors who have little use for the party establishment -- Brian Schweitzer of Montana and, appearing on our list as a new wild card, Howard Dean of Vermont -- might also try to rock the boat. None of them seem like particularly strong competitors to Clinton right now, although they all are current or former relatively prominent Democratic officehold ers.
Dropping off the list is Gov. John Hickenlooper (D-CO), who at this point needs to survive his reelection bid before he can entertain any long-shot run at the presidency.
If Clinton isn’t in the field, rip up this list -- a lot of other names will emerge. Like the ultimate effect of Christie’s bridge headaches, the shape of the Democratic field, with or without Clinton, remains murk
WASHINGTON — In his first Inaugural Address, President Obama stirred liberals by proclaiming that “we reject as false the choice between our safety and ideals.”
Five years in, the presidency has taught Mr. Obama that the choice he rejected is not so false after all. Ever since the disclosures about the extent of National Security Agency surveillance, leading to the changes that Mr. Obama plans to announce in a speech on Friday, a chastened president has embraced “balance” between competing imperatives of security and civil liberties.
History shows that is what the Oval Office does to everyone who occupies it. The grinding reality of governing the country nearly always gives the lie to the facile, I-can-square-the-circle formulations that winning candidates carry with them into the White House.
A tour through recent history shows Mr. Obama with plenty of company.Those formulations typically stem from candidates’ attempts to please all sides in contentious debates by acknowledging the concerns of opponents without surrendering their own principles. But it is rarely that easy.
When John F. Kennedy was campaigning for the White House and trying to counter concerns about his youth and inexperience as compared to his opponent, Richard M. Nixon, the two-term vice president, he ran as a fierce Cold Warrior who would close a “missile gap” with the Soviet Union. Once elected, he vowed in his Inaugural Address to “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe” in the nation’s defense.
Within three months, Kennedy had begun to distance himself from the idea that the missile gap even existed. (Intelligence showed that the United States was much better armed.) And he had, to his own and the nation’s embarrassment, withdrawn air cover for American-trained Cuban exiles seeking to overthrow Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs.
Four years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson tried to calm turbulence beneath the surface of postwar America while pursuing an ambitious civil rights, health care and antipoverty agenda. “The day and the time are here to achieve progress without strife, to achieve change without hatred, not without difference of opinion but without the deep and abiding divisions which scar the union for generations,” he said.
Johnson achieved much of the progress and change he sought, but with steadily escalating strife and divisions that persist today in America’s polarized political system.
In 1968, Nixon won as a candidate hard-nosed enough to calm riotous streets. But while promising “decent order” in his first inaugural address, he also sought to blunt his reputation as “Tricky Dick” by citing “the better angels our nature” — words from Abraham Lincoln’s first Inaugural Address — as an answer to the nation’s “crisis of the spirit.”
Five years later, Nixon resigned in disgrace over the Watergate scandal.
President Ronald Reagan insisted that he could cut taxes and the deficit at the same time, but he accomplished the former as deficits ballooned. His successor, President George Bush, pledged to curb the deficit while preserving Mr. Reagan’s tax cuts, but he ended up abandoning his no-new-taxes pledge to achieve a budget deal with congressional Democrats.
President Bill Clinton vowed to “invest more in our own people” while also cutting “our massive debt.” He left office with a budget surplus for the first time in a generation, but Congress made him set aside many of the investments.
As a self-described “compassionate conservative,” President George W. Bush advocated tax cuts while at the same time describing antipoverty work as a biblical imperative. “When we see that wounded traveler on the road to Jericho,” Mr. Bush told his first inaugural audience, “we will not pass to the other side.”
Mr. Bush proved far more successful on tax cutting than poverty fighting, and the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, soon transformed Mr. Bush’s agenda into that of a wartime president.
The controversies accompanying Mr. Bush’s emphasis on security — the Iraq war, the detainees held at Guantánamo Bay, the Abu Ghraib prison scandal and the National Security Agency’s surveillance — ignited strong Democratic opposition. But while Mr. Obama capitalized on the backlash against Mr. Bush’s security policies when he ran in the 2008 election, Mr. Obama also needed to assure Americans he could keep them safe.
In practice, Mr. Obama has continued and in some cases expanded many of the previous administration’s security policies, from striking foes with drone aircraft to maintaining the Guantánamo facility to preserving far-reaching N.S.A. surveillance.
If that represents a source of satisfaction to conservatives like former Vice President Dick Cheney, it has angered Mr. Obama’s liberal base as well as a rising band of libertarian Republicans, among them Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky.
Mr. Obama’s position reflects the lesson that Johnson alluded to in his memoirs. His father had told him no man could understand parenthood until becoming a parent, Johnson wrote, and he came to think of the presidency the same way.
“Presidents are always going to grow and evolve because of what they learn,” said the presidential historian Michael Beschloss. “A president who does not do that is someone you probably don’t want as president.”
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release January 17, 2014
PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-28
SUBJECT: Signals Intelligence Activities
The United States, like other nations, has gathered intelligence
throughout its history to ensure that national security and
foreign policy decisionmakers have access to timely, accurate,
and insightful information.
The collection of signals intelligence is necessary for the
United States to advance its national security and foreign
policy interests and to protect its citizens and the citizens of
its allies and partners from harm. At the same time, signals
intelligence activities and the possibility that such activities
may be improperly disclosed to the public pose multiple risks.
These include risks to: our relationships with other nations,
including the cooperation we receive from other nations on law
enforcement, counterterrorism, and other issues; our commercial,
economic, and financial interests, including a potential loss of
international trust in U.S. firms and the decreased willingness
of other nations to participate in international data sharing,
privacy, and regulatory regimes; the credibility of our
commitment to an open, interoperable, and secure global
Internet; and the protection of intelligence sources and
In addition, our signals intelligence activities must take into
account that all persons should be treated with dignity and
respect, regardless of their nationality or wherever they might
reside, and that all persons have legitimate privacy interests
in the handling of their personal information.
In determining why, whether, when, and how the United States
conducts signals intelligence activities, we must weigh all of
these considerations in a context in which information and
communications technologies are constantly changing. The
evolution of technology has created a world where communications
important to our national security and the communications all of
us make as part of our daily lives are transmitted through the
same channels. This presents new and diverse opportunities for,
and challenges with respect to, the collection of intelligence –
and especially signals intelligence. The United States
Intelligence Community (IC) has achieved remarkable success in
developing enhanced capabilities to perform its signals
intelligence mission in this rapidly changing world, and these
enhanced capabilities are a major reason we have been able to
adapt to a dynamic and challenging security environment.1 The
1 For the purposes of this directive, the terms "Intelligence Community" and
"elements of the Intelligence Community" shall have the same meaning as they
do in Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981, as amended (Executive Order
United States must preserve and continue to develop a robust and
technologically advanced signals intelligence capability to
protect our security and that of our partners and allies. Our
signals intelligence capabilities must also be agile enough to
enable us to focus on fleeting opportunities or emerging crises
and to address not only the issues of today, but also the issues
of tomorrow, which we may not be able to foresee.
Advanced technologies can increase risks, as well as
opportunities, however, and we must consider these risks when
deploying our signals intelligence capabilities. The IC
conducts signals intelligence activities with care and precision
to ensure that its collection, retention, use, and dissemination
of signals intelligence account for these risks. In light of
the evolving technological and geopolitical environment, we must
continue to ensure that our signals intelligence policies and
practices appropriately take into account our alliances and
other partnerships; the leadership role that the United States
plays in upholding democratic principles and universal human
rights; the increased globalization of trade, investment, and
information flows; our commitment to an open, interoperable and
secure global Internet; and the legitimate privacy and civil
liberties concerns of U.S. citizens and citizens of other
Presidents have long directed the acquisition of foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence2 pursuant to their
constitutional authority to conduct U.S. foreign relations and
to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities as Commander in
Chief and Chief Executive. They have also provided direction on
the conduct of intelligence activities in furtherance of these
authorities and responsibilities, as well as in execution of
laws enacted by the Congress. Consistent with this historical
practice, this directive articulates principles to guide why,
whether, when, and how the United States conducts signals
intelligence activities for authorized foreign intelligence and
Section 1. Principles Governing the Collection of Signals
Signals intelligence collection shall be authorized and
conducted consistent with the following principles:
(a) The collection of signals intelligence shall be
authorized by statute or Executive Order, proclamation,
or other Presidential directive, and undertaken in
2 For the purposes of this directive, the terms "foreign intelligence" and
"counterintelligence" shall have the same meaning as they have in Executive
Order 12333. Thus, "foreign intelligence" means "information relating to the
capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements
thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international
terrorists," and "counterintelligence" means "information gathered and
activities conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect
against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations
conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations, or persons, or
their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities."
Executive Order 12333 further notes that "[i]ntelligence includes foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence."
3 Unless otherwise specified, this directive shall apply to signals
intelligence activities conducted in order to collect communications or
information about communications, except that it shall not apply to signals
intelligence activities undertaken to test or develop signals intelligence
(b) Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral
accordance with the Constitution and applicable statutes,
Executive Orders, proclamations, and Presidential
considerations in the planning of U.S. signals
intelligence activities. The United States shall not
collect signals intelligence for the purpose of
suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent, or for
disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race,
gender, sexual orientation, or religion. Signals
intelligence shall be collected exclusively where there
is a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose
to support national and departmental missions and not for
any other purposes.
(c) The collection of foreign private commercial information
or trade secrets is authorized only to protect the
national security of the United States or its partners
and allies. It is not an authorized foreign intelligence
or counterintelligence purpose to collect such
information to afford a competitive advantage4 to U.S.
companies and U.S. business sectors commercially.
(d) Signals intelligence activities shall be as tailored as
feasible. In determining whether to collect signals
intelligence, the United States shall consider the
availability of other information, including from
diplomatic and public sources. Such appropriate and
feasible alternatives to signals intelligence should be
Sec. 2. Limitations on the Use of Signals Intelligence
Collected in Bulk.
Locating new or emerging threats and other vital national
security information is difficult, as such information is often
hidden within the large and complex system of modern global
communications. The United States must consequently collect
signals intelligence in bulk5 in certain circumstances in order
to identify these threats. Routine communications and
communications of national security interest increasingly
transit the same networks, however, and the collection of
signals intelligence in bulk may consequently result in the
collection of information about persons whose activities are not
of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value. The
United States will therefore impose new limits on its use of
signals intelligence collected in bulk. These limits are
intended to protect the privacy and civil liberties of all
persons, whatever their nationality and regardless of where they
In particular, when the United States collects nonpublicly
available signals intelligence in bulk, it shall use that data
4 Certain economic purposes, such as identifying trade or sanctions violations
or government influence or direction, shall not constitute competitive
5 The limitations contained in this section do not apply to signals
intelligence data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted
collection. References to signals intelligence collected in "bulk" mean the
authorized collection of large quantities of signals intelligence data which,
due to technical or operational considerations, is acquired without the use
of discriminants (e.g., specific identifiers, selection terms, etc.).
only for the purposes of detecting and countering: (1)
espionage and other threats and activities directed by foreign
powers or their intelligence services against the United States
and its interests; (2) threats to the United States and its
interests from terrorism; (3) threats to the United States and
its interests from the development, possession, proliferation,
or use of weapons of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity
threats; (5) threats to U.S. or allied Armed Forces or other U.S
or allied personnel; and (6) transnational criminal threats,
including illicit finance and sanctions evasion related to the
other purposes named in this section. In no event may signals
intelligence collected in bulk be used for the purpose of
suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent; disadvantaging
persons based on their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual
orientation, or religion; affording a competitive advantage to
U.S. companies and U.S. business sectors commercially; or
achieving any purpose other than those identified in this
The Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor
(APNSA), in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI), shall coordinate, on at least an annual
basis, a review of the permissible uses of signals intelligence
collected in bulk through the National Security Council
Principals and Deputies Committee system identified in PPD-1 or
any successor document. At the end of this review, I will be
presented with recommended additions to or removals from the
list of the permissible uses of signals intelligence collected
The DNI shall maintain a list of the permissible uses of signals
intelligence collected in bulk. This list shall be updated as
necessary and made publicly available to the maximum extent
feasible, consistent with the national security.
Sec. 3. Refining the Process for Collecting Signals
U.S. intelligence collection activities present the potential
for national security damage if improperly disclosed. Signals
intelligence collection raises special concerns, given the
opportunities and risks created by the constantly evolving
technological and geopolitical environment; the unique nature of
such collection and the inherent concerns raised when signals
intelligence can only be collected in bulk; and the risk of
damage to our national security interests and our law
enforcement, intelligence-sharing, and diplomatic relationships
should our capabilities or activities be compromised. It is,
therefore, essential that national security policymakers
consider carefully the value of signals intelligence activities
in light of the risks entailed in conducting these activities.
To enable this judgment, the heads of departments and agencies
that participate in the policy processes for establishing
signals intelligence priorities and requirements shall, on an
annual basis, review any priorities or requirements identified
by their departments or agencies and advise the DNI whether each
should be maintained, with a copy of the advice provided to the
Additionally, the classified Annex to this directive, which
supplements the existing policy process for reviewing signals
intelligence activities, affirms that determinations about
whether and how to conduct signals intelligence activities must
carefully evaluate the benefits to our national interests and
the risks posed by those activities.6
Sec. 4. Safeguarding Personal Information Collected Through
All persons should be treated with dignity and respect,
regardless of their nationality or wherever they might reside,
and all persons have legitimate privacy interests in the
handling of their personal information.7 U.S. signals
intelligence activities must, therefore, include appropriate
safeguards for the personal information of all individuals,
regardless of the nationality of the individual to whom the
information pertains or where that individual resides.
(a) Policies and Procedures. The DNI, in consultation with
the Attorney General, shall ensure that all elements of
the IC establish policies and procedures that apply the
following principles for safeguarding personal
information collected from signals intelligence
activities. To the maximum extent feasible consistent
with the national security, these policies and procedures
are to be applied equally to the personal information of
all persons, regardless of nationality:
i. Minimization. The sharing of intelligence that
contains personal information is necessary to protect
our national security and advance our foreign policy
interests, as it enables the United States to
coordinate activities across our government. At the
same time, however, by setting appropriate limits on
such sharing, the United States takes legitimate
privacy concerns into account and decreases the risks
that personal information will be misused or
mishandled. Relatedly, the significance to our
national security of intelligence is not always
apparent upon an initial review of information:
intelligence must be retained for a sufficient period
of time for the IC to understand its relevance and use
6 Section 3 of this directive, and the directive's classified Annex, do not
apply to (1) signals intelligence activities undertaken by or for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation in support of predicated investigations other than
those conducted solely for purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence; or (2)
signals intelligence activities undertaken in support of military operations
in an area of active hostilities, covert action, or human intelligence
7 Departments and agencies shall apply the term "personal information" in a
manner that is consistent for U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons.
Accordingly, for the purposes of this directive, the term "personal
information" shall cover the same types of information covered by
"information concerning U.S. persons" under section 2.3 of Executive Order
8 The collection, retention, and dissemination of information concerning
"United States persons" is governed by multiple legal and policy
requirements, such as those required by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act and Executive Order 12333. For the purposes of this directive, the term
"United States person" shall have the same meaning as it does in Executive
9 The policies and procedures of affected elements of the IC shall also be
consistent with any additional IC policies, standards, procedures, and
guidance the DNI, in coordination with the Attorney General, the heads of IC
elements, and the heads of any other departments containing such elements,
may issue to implement these principles. This directive is not intended to
alter the rules applicable to U.S. persons in Executive Order 12333, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or other applicable law.
it to meet our national security needs. However,
long-term storage of personal information unnecessary
to protect our national security is inefficient,
unnecessary, and raises legitimate privacy concerns.
Accordingly, IC elements shall establish policies and
procedures reasonably designed to minimize the
dissemination and retention of personal information
collected from signals intelligence activities.
Dissemination: Personal information shall be
Retention: Personal information shall be retained
disseminated only if the dissemination of comparable
information concerning U.S. persons would be
permitted under section 2.3 of Executive Order
only if the retention of comparable information
concerning U.S. persons would be permitted under
section 2.3 of Executive Order 12333 and shall be
subject to the same retention periods as applied to
comparable information concerning U.S. persons.
Information for which no such determination has been
made shall not be retained for more than 5 years,
unless the DNI expressly determines that continued
retention is in the national security interests of
the United States.
Additionally, within 180 days of the date of this
directive, the DNI, in coordination with the
Attorney General, the heads of other elements of the
IC, and the heads of departments and agencies
containing other elements of the IC, shall prepare a
report evaluating possible additional dissemination
and retention safeguards for personal information
collected through signals intelligence, consistent
with technical capabilities and operational needs.
ii. Data Security and Access. When our national security
and foreign policy needs require us to retain certain
intelligence, it is vital that the United States take
appropriate steps to ensure that any personal
information contained within that intelligence is
secure. Accordingly, personal information shall be
processed and stored under conditions that provide
adequate protection and prevent access by unauthorized
persons, consistent with the applicable safeguards for
sensitive information contained in relevant Executive
Orders, proclamations, Presidential directives,
IC directives, and associated policies. Access to
such personal information shall be limited to
authorized personnel with a need to know the
information to perform their mission, consistent with
the personnel security requirements of relevant
Executive Orders, IC directives, and associated
policies. Such personnel will be provided appropriate
and adequate training in the principles set forth in
this directive. These persons may access and use the
information consistent with applicable laws and
Executive Orders and the principles of this directive;
personal information for which no determination has
been made that it can be permissibly disseminated or
retained under section 4(a)(i) of this directive shall
be accessed only in order to make such determinations
(or to conduct authorized administrative, security,
and oversight functions).
iii. Data Quality. IC elements strive to provide national
security policymakers with timely, accurate, and
insightful intelligence, and inaccurate records and
reporting can not only undermine our national security
interests, but also can result in the collection or
analysis of information relating to persons whose
activities are not of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence value. Accordingly, personal
information shall be included in intelligence products
only as consistent with applicable IC standards for
accuracy and objectivity, as set forth in relevant
IC directives. Moreover, while IC elements should
apply the IC Analytic Standards as a whole, particular
care should be taken to apply standards relating to
the quality and reliability of the information,
consideration of alternative sources of information
and interpretations of data, and objectivity in
iv. Oversight. The IC has long recognized that effective
oversight is necessary to ensure that we are
protecting our national security in a manner
consistent with our interests and values.
Accordingly, the policies and procedures of IC
elements, and departments and agencies containing IC
elements, shall include appropriate measures to
facilitate oversight over the implementation of
safeguards protecting personal information, to include
periodic auditing against the standards required by
The policies and procedures shall also recognize and
facilitate the performance of oversight by the
Inspectors General of IC elements, and departments and
agencies containing IC elements, and other relevant
oversight entities, as appropriate and consistent with
their responsibilities. When a significant compliance
issue occurs involving personal information of any
person, regardless of nationality, collected as a
result of signals intelligence activities, the issue
shall, in addition to any existing reporting
requirements, be reported promptly to the DNI, who
shall determine what, if any, corrective actions are
necessary. If the issue involves a non-United States
person, the DNI, in consultation with the Secretary of
State and the head of the notifying department or
agency, shall determine whether steps should be taken
to notify the relevant foreign government, consistent
with the protection of sources and methods and of U.S.
(b) Update and Publication. Within 1 year of the date of
this directive, IC elements shall update or issue new
policies and procedures as necessary to implement
section 4 of this directive, in coordination with the
DNI. To enhance public understanding of, and promote
public trust in, the safeguards in place to protect
personal information, these updated or newly issued
policies and procedures shall be publicly released
to the maximum extent possible, consistent with
(c) Privacy and Civil Liberties Policy Official. To help
ensure that the legitimate privacy interests all people
share related to the handling of their personal
information are appropriately considered in light of the
principles in this section, the APNSA, the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) shall identify one or more senior officials who
will be responsible for working with the DNI, the
Attorney General, the heads of other elements of the IC,
and the heads of departments and agencies containing
other elements of the IC, as appropriate, as they develop
the policies and procedures called for in this section.
(d) Coordinator for International Diplomacy. The Secretary
of State shall identify a senior official within the
Department of State to coordinate with the responsible
departments and agencies the United States Government's
diplomatic and foreign policy efforts related to
international information technology issues and to serve
as a point of contact for foreign governments who wish to
raise concerns regarding signals intelligence activities
conducted by the United States.
Sec. 5. Reports.
(a) Within 180 days of the date of this directive, the DNI
(b) The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board is
shall provide a status report that updates me on the
progress of the IC's implementation of section 4 of this
encouraged to provide me with a report that assesses the
implementation of any matters contained within this
directive that fall within its mandate.
(c) Within 120 days of the date of this directive, the
President's Intelligence Advisory Board shall provide
me with a report identifying options for assessing
the distinction between metadata and other types of
information, and for replacing the "need-to-share" or
"need-to-know" models for classified information sharing
with a Work-Related Access model.
(d) Within 1 year of the date of this directive, the DNI, in
coordination with the heads of relevant elements of the
IC and OSTP, shall provide me with a report assessing the
feasibility of creating software that would allow the IC
more easily to conduct targeted information acquisition
rather than bulk collection.
Sec. 6. General Provisions.
(a) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to prevent
me from exercising my constitutional authority, including
as Commander in Chief, Chief Executive, and in the
conduct of foreign affairs, as well as my statutory
authority. Consistent with this principle, a recipient
of this directive may at any time recommend to me,
through the APNSA, a change to the policies and
procedures contained in this directive.
(b) Nothing in this directive shall be construed to
impair or otherwise affect the authority or
responsibility granted by law to a United States
Government department or agency, or the head thereof,
or the functions of the Director of OMB relating to
budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
This directive is intended to supplement existing
processes or procedures for reviewing foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities and should
not be read to supersede such processes and procedures
unless explicitly stated.
(c) This directive shall be implemented consistent with
applicable U.S. law and subject to the availability of
(d) This directive is not intended to, and does not, create
any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,
enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the
United States, its departments, agencies, or entities,
its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
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